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Abstract 
This review investigates the presence of young children‟s model-based cultural transmission 
biases in social learning, arguing that such biases are adaptive and flexible. Section 1 offers 
five propositions regarding the presence and direction of model-based transmission biases in 
young children‟s copying of a model. Section 2 discusses the cognitive abilities required for 
differing model-based biases and tracks their development in early childhood. Section 3 
suggests future areas of research including considering the social aspect of model-based 
biases and understanding their use within a comparative perspective. 
Keywords: Social learning, model-based biases, cultural transmission, social cognition, trust. 
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Social learning is ubiquitous in humans, and fundamental to children‟s development, 1 
but alone cannot explain the unique stability and diversity of human culture. Research from a 2 
plethora of academic discplines investigating cultural evolution has escalated in recent years 3 
(Boyd, Richerson, & Henrich, 2011; Whiten, Hinde, Laland, & Stringer, 2011), increasing 4 
our understanding of the circumstances that facilitate social learning. Theoretical models of 5 
cultural evolution predict the evolution of flexible strategies enabling avoidance of unreliable 6 
or redundant information, and influencing the circumstances under which individuals copy 7 
others (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Thus, social learning is not seen as inherently beneficial 8 
and must be used selectively in the context of the observer‟s environmental and model-based 9 
cues (characteristics of a demonstrator exhibiting a behaviour pattern). The use of such cues 10 
in guiding behaviour is known as „cultural transmission biases‟ (Boyd & Richerson, 1985, 11 
also termed „social learning strategies‟; Laland, 2004) and allows populations to approach 12 
adaptive optima much faster than they otherwise would under individual learning (Mesoudi 13 
& O'Brien, 2008) or unbiased social learning in which individuals acquire variants according 14 
to the frequency at which they are practiced (Rendell et al., 2011).  15 
The adaptive value of model-based biases have been investigated in disciplines such 16 
as evolutionary biology, anthropology and non-developmental domains of psychology. 17 
Model-based biases have been described as „who‟ biases (Laland, 2004), indirect biases 18 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1985) and context dependent model-based biases (Henrich & McElreath, 19 
2003). Within developmental psychology it has long been established that it is important to 20 
understand whom children learn from, and that children‟s learning entails „an active construct 21 
of the model by the individual‟ (Užgiris, 1981, p. 2). As children develop they constantly 22 
witness alternative methods of achieving a goal. This has been mirrored in experiments where 23 
children witness divergent information from different models relating to tool-use (Wood, 24 
Kendal, & Flynn, in prep), and labels for elements in the environment (Koenig, Clément, & 25 
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Harris, 2004). When faced with divergent information it would be adaptive to select and 26 
reproduce the information that achieves the outcome most suited for one‟s needs, but this can 27 
be complex. Models have different characteristics that influence our choice, including their 28 
previous performance, knowledge state, age, sex and social status. Furthermore, observers‟ 29 
own characteristics may influence who is the „best‟ model for them. The potential list of 30 
relevant characteristics is endless and a naïve individual needs to evaluate these 31 
characterisitcs so that the behaviour of the most appropriate model, potentially providing the 32 
most useful and adaptive behaviour, is adopted.  33 
This review uses an evolutionary approach to understand how model characterisitcs 34 
bias the likelihood that an observing child copies modelled behaviour. We define copying as 35 
a broad behaviour of a child either matching the behaviour of a model or preferentially 36 
selecting one model‟s behaviour (e.g. a novel object is given a different word label by two 37 
models and when prompted, the child repeats one of the models‟ word labels). Copying is an 38 
important mechansim in children‟s social learning. Whilst focusing on instances of copying a 39 
model, we acknowledge that children are able to learn behaviour without necessarily 40 
reproducing every aspect of a demonstration (Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; 41 
Flynn & Whiten, 2008; Williamson, Meltzoff, & Markman, 2008) and that copying a model 42 
may serve a function beyond simply learning behaviour (Over & Carpenter, 2011). In Section 43 
1 we argue that model-based biases enable children to gain the most useful information 44 
pertaining to their environment; hence a model-based bias may be viewed as an adaptive 45 
cognitive tool. Throughout this review, adaptive means that the model-based bias contributes 46 
to an individual‟s survival by providing them with more useful behaviours within their 47 
environment, or enables avoidance of unreliable or redundant information, than if such a 48 
model-based bias did not exist. In Section 2 we describe the developmental shift in the 49 
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implementation of model-based biases, demonstrating increasingly flexible implementation. 50 
We conclude in Section 3 by discussing future considerations and directions.  51 
 52 
Section 1: The adaptive value of model-based biases 53 
In this section we make five propositions regarding the adaptive value of model-based biases. 54 
To begin, we examine children‟s biases towards models whose behaviour indicates their 55 
desire to transfer information, namely children‟s receptiveness to pedagogical cueing. 56 
Second, we consider children‟s ability to evaluate and copy the most proficient individual 57 
before moving on to discussing characteristics that identify models as belonging to groups 58 
with certain reputations that may guide children‟s copying. Fourth, we argue that the more 59 
similar a model is to a child, the more suitable s/he might be as a model, before finishing by 60 
discussing children‟s biases towards models that are prestigious.  61 
 62 
Proposition 1: Children are biased towards those who intend to teach 63 
Csibra and Gergely (2009) argue that children have an innate predisposition for 64 
receptiveness towards people‟s ostensive signals indicating that the person is trying to 65 
communicate relevant information. These cues may include pointing, eye contact, and verbal 66 
directions. If a person is actively trying to communicate information then, generally, the 67 
person is communicating information about the environment that they believe will assist the 68 
observer. Being sensitive to a model‟s ostensive cues is adaptive because it enables children‟s 69 
attention to be drawn to important aspects of the environment. The sensitivity to ostensive 70 
cues is present from infancy, for example fourteen-month-olds search where they see 71 
someone point (Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2005) and copy the unusual action of 72 
turning a light on with their head if told by the model “I‟m going to blick the light‟ as 73 
opposed to just “Look at this” (Chen & Waxman, 2013). This sensitivity influences which 74 
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models individuals copy; children copy a model more when s/he stoops to the child‟s level, 75 
leans in, makes eye contact and talks engagingly (Brugger, Lariviere, Mumme, & Bushnell, 76 
2007), gives verbal cues about the importance of actions (Southgate, Chevallier, & Csibra, 77 
2009) or performs actions in a seemingly purposeful, rather than accidental manner 78 
(Carpenter, Akhta, & Tomasello, 1998; Gardiner, Greif, & Bjorklund, 2011). Indeed this 79 
receptiveness to pedagogical cueing is so strong it can limit exploratory play and discovery 80 
(Bonawitz, Shafto, Gweon, Goodman, Spelke, & Schulz, 2011). Thus, children are receptive 81 
to pedagogical cueing and are biased towards copying models who attempt to share 82 
information about the environment.  83 
 84 
Proposition 2: Children are biased toward copying the most proficient models 85 
A model‟s success in a particular context indicates his or her ability to deal with that 86 
environment, therefore a successful model‟s behaviour is the most adaptive behaviour to 87 
adopt. There is evidence that infants are able to discriminate between models who act 88 
competently or incompetently (Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum, 2010) and seven-89 
year-old children preferentially copy children rated by an experimenter as being competent 90 
rather than less competent (Brody & Stoneman, 1985). Likewise, the „Trust‟ paradigm 91 
(Harris, 2007; Koenig & Harris, 2005a), whereby children are introduced to one reliable 92 
model (e.g., labels a ball, “ball”) and one unreliable model (e.g., labels a ball, “shoe”), has 93 
demonstrated that, from infancy to six-years-old, children consistently copy reliable models 94 
over unreliable labellers for novel words (Koenig et al., 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005b; 95 
Vázquez, Delisle, & Saylor, 2012) and artefact use (Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008; Zmyj et 96 
al., 2010). The labelling of artefacts are more likely to be copied from models who self-97 
declare they know what is right (declaring, “this is a spoon”) than models who are uncertain 98 
(“I think this is a fork”; Jaswal & Malone, 2007) and models who are labelled as smart rather 99 
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than not smart (Lane, Wellman & Gelman, 2012). Thus, children are able to discern the 100 
proficient model and are biased towards the information this model provides.  101 
   102 
Proposition 3: Children are biased toward copying models belonging to a group which 103 
has a reputation for being proficient 104 
Employing model-based biases regarding an individual‟s proficiency is costly in 105 
terms of time and cognitive processing, as it requires an assessment of the behavioural history 106 
of a model. Instead, it is more efficient for an individual to be biased towards characteristics 107 
of models that are easily identifiable, often indicating an individual‟s membership to a group. 108 
This group may have a different reputation for proficiency from another group leading to 109 
model-based biases. For example, a salient characteristic indicating group membership is age. 110 
A „copy older over younger models‟ strategy seems adaptive because older individuals have 111 
had more experience with the environment and, by their continued existence, have made 112 
successful choices within the environment. Such age biases exist. Fifteen-month-olds are 113 
more likely to copy videotaped target acts when presented by an adult versus a two-year-old 114 
child (Seehagen & Herbert, 2011). Younger (one- to two-year-olds) siblings copy the 115 
spontaneous social behaviours of their older (three- to five-year-old) siblings far more than 116 
the other way around regardless of age gap or sex differences (Abramovitch, Corter, & 117 
Pepler, 1980; Pepler, Abramovitch, & Corter, 1981). Three- and four-year-olds preferentially 118 
copy information provided by an adult over a child for novel object labelling (Jaswal & 119 
Neely, 2006), and object less when a puppet copies an adult, rather than a child model 120 
demonstrating alternative actions on a novel game (Rakoczy, Hamann, Warneken, & 121 
Tomasello, 2010). Also, seven- and eight-year-olds copy the food choices of older rather than 122 
younger children (Brody & Stoneman, 1981). This bias towards copying older individuals is 123 
also seen in the reproduction of causally irrelevant actions by children; when models use 124 
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causally-inefficient tools, adults are more likely to be copied than children (Elekes & Kiraly, 125 
2012), two- and three-year olds do not copy the irrelevant actions demonstrated by a peer to 126 
the same extent as when demonstrated by adult models (Flynn, 2008; Horner & Whiten, 127 
2005), and three- and five-year-olds copy relevant actions of both child and adult models but 128 
only faithfully reproduce the irrelevant actions of adults (McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 129 
2011; Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012). Potentially, children assume that increased age 130 
indicates increased proficiency and use this bias to guide their copying (although see Section 131 
2 for instances where this does not happen).  132 
 133 
Proposition 4: Children are biased toward copying models that resemble themselves 134 
Individual differences result in individualised needs within an environment. These 135 
differences can influence children‟s proclivity to gain information from a model that is most 136 
similar to them, an „observer-specific model-based bias‟. This observer-specific bias may 137 
happen at a genetic, physiological or cultural level. For example, four- and five-year-olds 138 
generally accepted their mother‟s claims over those of a stranger (Corriveau et al., 2009) 139 
indicating that children may select information from those more genetically related to them. 140 
Familiarity is a confound to this interpretation, yet familiarity itself can be a marker of in-141 
group membership and infants copy more actions of a familiar, compared to an unfamiliar, 142 
model (Learmonth, Lamberth, & Rovee-Collier, 2005). Likewise, three- to five-year-old 143 
children, given conflicting artefact labels and functions from a known or unknown teacher, 144 
preferentially copy the known teacher (Corriveau & Harris, 2009b). Children also copy the 145 
choices of familiar models when choosing personal preferences or labelling artefacts (Shutts, 146 
Kinzler, McKee, & Spelke, 2009) and in tool use tasks (Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum & 147 
Carpenter, 2012; Seehagen & Herbert, 2011). This preference for copying familiar models is 148 
adaptive because the child and the model have definite overlaps in their environment whereas 149 
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the history of the stranger is unknown and, therefore, the information they provide may not 150 
be relevant for the child‟s particular environment.  151 
Another salient physiological group difference is sex and whilst sex is not necessarily 152 
correlated to ability within our environment, children may be influenced by cultural sex-role 153 
norms. Indeed, eighteen-month-old children discriminate between stereotypical male and 154 
female artefacts (Serbin, Poulin-Dubois, Colburne, Sen, & Eichstedt, 2001). Likewise, three-155 
year-olds copy the preferences of same-sex (over different-sex) child models for personal 156 
preferences of novel food, clothes, toys and games (Frazier, Gelman, Kaciroti, Russell, & 157 
Lumeng, 2011; Shutts, Banaji, & Spelke, 2010) and copy the novel word label from a same 158 
sex rather than opposite sex adult model when both adults were equally reliable (Taylor, 159 
2013). This adoption of sex-specific behaviour may provide children with relevant 160 
information pertaining to their physiological needs or it may enable them to learn behaviours 161 
expected of their sex by their cultural group.  162 
Learning other appropriate behaviour for one‟s cultural group seems fundamental to a 163 
child‟s development and there is evidence for a bias towards copying those belonging to the 164 
same cultural group. Twelve-month-olds show a personal preference for foods endorsed by a 165 
speaker of their native language versus a model speaking a foreign language (Shutts et al., 166 
2009). Likewise, five- and six-month-old infants attend more to a model speaking natural 167 
English over a model speaking „reverse‟ English (the audio was played backwards) or a 168 
foreign language, and infants are also biased towards selecting a toy endorsed by a model 169 
speaking their native language (Kinzler, Corriveau, & Harris 2011) or using a native accent 170 
(Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke, 2007). Language is one of the most basic markers of cultural 171 
identity and, as seen with familiarity, a bias towards copying models who share your culture 172 
may be adaptive because the cultural similarity indicates a shared environment, and, 173 
therefore, the behaviour of the most similar model may be the most relevant.  174 
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 175 
Proposition 5: Children are biased towards copying models with high status 176 
Status incorporates two forms of social power; dominance, defined as an ability to 177 
acquire and monopolise resources over others, often through threatened or actual antagonism, 178 
and prestige, defined as status through non-agonistic means achieved through excelling in 179 
valued domains. Henrich and Gil-White (2001) note the importance of differentiating these 180 
two forms of status, which have their „own distinct psychology, selected for by distinct 181 
evolutionary pressures‟ (p. 166). Humans can exhibit status through non-agonistic means and 182 
attainment of high prestige may reflect an individual‟s superior ability to deal with his/her 183 
physical or social environment. The behaviour of high-status individuals, whether the status 184 
was acquired through skill or force, may thus be adaptive. In turn, it would be adaptive to 185 
copy models of high status, although such an adaption may result in copying behavioural 186 
traits that do not relate to the attainment of higher status (Mesoudi & O‟Brien, 2008), hence 187 
the term „indirect bias‟ (Boyd & Richerson,1985). 188 
Teacher ratings of social status and dominance of children correlate with observable 189 
characteristics, such as the age of a child (Grusec & Lytton, 1988), his/her size, and the 190 
number of wins in agonistic encounters with other children over resources (Pellegrini et al., 191 
2007). Flynn and Whiten (2012) investigated both dominance and prestige in pre-school 192 
children‟s social learning. There was evidence of a status-based model-based observation bias 193 
in these children; in a naturalistic, open diffusion setting with a novel puzzle-box, older 194 
children were watched more than younger children, popular children were watched more than 195 
less popular children, and more dominant children were watched more than less dominant 196 
children. This observation bias indicates a potential copying bias of more prestigious 197 
individuals. As dominant children did not monopolise the task, it seems they were watched 198 
out of choice. Further, children were more likely to watch task manipulations made by peers 199 
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they stated that they „liked‟ rather than peers they stated that they did „not like‟. Likewise, 200 
McGuigan (2013) found that the higher the status of the model (the child‟s head teacher 201 
versus a known researcher) the greater the number of irrelevant actions were copied.  202 
Whether a model is observed by others may, in itself, be a marker of prestige; four-203 
year-old children use bystanders‟ silent reactions to models such that a model who was 204 
„endorsed‟ by bystanders through nods and smiles was copied more for labelling novel 205 
artefacts than a model whose behaviour was met with negative bystander reactions (Fusaro & 206 
Harris, 2008). This endorsement effect occurs even when the bystander attendance is neutral 207 
in comparison to an ignored model (Chudek, Heller, Birch, & Henrich, 2012). Children are 208 
receptive to the status of others and are biased towards copying those who have higher status 209 
both in terms of dominance and prestige. It would be fruitful to explore the nature of the 210 
relation between model status and often associated characteristics, such as proficiency and 211 
age, to discover what factors contribute towards prestige. Likewise, to investigate whether 212 
biased copying from prestigious models is, in some circumstances, limited to behaviour 213 
which potentially contributes to the attainment of prestige, rather than being indiscriminate in 214 
this regard as theoretically assumed (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). 215 
 216 
Summary 217 
 We have outlined five propositions relating to the presence and adaptive value of 218 
model-based biases. Indeed, the propositions outlined can be adapted to make testable 219 
predictions about model-based biases. For example, in line with Proposition 1 we predict that 220 
any model who, through verbal or non verbal means, communicates an intention to teach will 221 
be more likely to be copied than a model who provides no cues or non-pedagogical 222 
communication. Likewise, we predict that, in line with Proposition 3, groups that have a 223 
reputation for being more proficient will be copied more than comparative groups. Whilst this 224 
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section focussed on age we believe that other groups relating to, for example, profession, 225 
level of education or expertise, could illicit the same model-based biases. 226 
The evidence presented demonstrates that children monitor the characteristics or 227 
behaviour of others and use this to guide their own behaviour. Such abilities drive children to 228 
copy others, hence socially learn, in a discriminating manner. This behaviour goes beyond 229 
simply copying, as it is biased copying and it is this bias which makes copying adaptive. The 230 
skills required for the implementation of biases are varied. Some model characteristics, such 231 
as a model‟s age and sex, are salient whilst others, such as proficiency and professed 232 
knowledge state, are more subtle. Evaluation of these more subtle cues requires the 233 
development of certain cognitive skills, such as an ability to track behaviour and understand 234 
the knowledge states of others. The next section presents some of the cognitive skills that 235 
improve the application of model-based biases and discusses their development in line with 236 
the findings from the social learning literature. 237 
 238 
Section 2: The development of cognitive skills enabling model-based biases 239 
This section reflects on some cognitive skills required in two periods of child development, 240 
infancy and early childhood, which enable and assist in implementing model-based biases. 241 
The cognitive skills described here are relatively high-level and based on empirical papers 242 
detailing model-based biases. Therefore, lower-level cognitive processes, such as working 243 
memory, categorisation or language development are not discussed, although future work 244 
addressing the influence of these processes on model-based biases seems pertinent. Cognitive 245 
skills develop throughout infancy and early childhood and this development affects the use of 246 
model-based biases. We argue that these developing cognitive skills enable children to 247 
flexibly employ model-based biases in response to environmental and behavioural cues. This 248 
12 
 
flexibility is important because it allows children to continually source and copy the „best‟ 249 
model even when there are complex, subtle and multiple model characteristics.   250 
 251 
From Infancy 252 
Perspective taking. From infancy children respond differently depending on a 253 
model‟s visual access to stimuli and, therefore, potentially what the model knows (Koenig & 254 
Echols, 2003; Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008). This perspective taking may 255 
facilitate the earliest forms of a model-based bias of proficiency. For example, a model who 256 
saw where a toy was hidden should be more proficient at locating the toy than a model who 257 
was unable to see where it was hidden. Such a model is more proficient in the immediate 258 
situation, as opposed to having a reputation for being proficient.  259 
Monitoring reactions to the model’s behaviour. Infants are also able to monitor the 260 
reaction of others towards a model‟s behaviour. Infants avoid copying an action when 261 
unknown adults react negatively to an adult model‟s actions (Repacholi, 2009) or show 262 
irritation towards the model (Repacholi & Meltzoff, 2007). A similar pattern is found in 263 
three- and four-year-olds when the model is a same-aged peer (Frazier et al., 2011) and also 264 
with novel word copying in four-year-olds who copy the novel artefact labels of models for 265 
whom bystanders react with smiles, more than the labels given by models for whom 266 
bystanders react with frowns (Fusaro & Harris, 2008). This ability to take account of the 267 
reactions of others could facilitate two model-based biases proposed in Section 1: first, the 268 
reactions of others may indicate that the model has performed a behaviour that pleases or 269 
displeases others and, therefore, indicates some degree of third-party evaluated model 270 
proficiency (proposition 2), and second, the reactions of others may be directed towards the 271 
model themselves and this could indicate some level of prestige (proposition 5). Presenting 272 
third-party bystanders who disapproved of clearly correctly modelled behaviour will help 273 
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differentiate between these biases. Either way, the ability to monitor the reactions of others is 274 
a useful skill in the implementation of model-based biases.  275 
Considering context. The best model in one context may not be the best model in 276 
another context, and children appear to show flexibility in the model-based biases employed. 277 
Six-month-olds are more likely to copy an action demonstrated by their mother over a 278 
stranger (the experimenter) in the infants‟ homes, but in a laboratory this pattern is reversed 279 
and they preferentially copy the experimenter (Seehagen & Herbert, 2012). These authors 280 
suggest that infants have expectations about the two models‟ usefulness as teachers; they 281 
spend much time with their mothers who demonstrate pedagogical cues in the familiar 282 
environment. Conversely, an infant might have experienced unfamiliar people mostly in 283 
unfamiliar settings and, thus, have either formed the expectation that unfamiliar people are 284 
knowledgeable in unfamiliar environments or display associative learning of unfamiliar 285 
models in unfamiliar environments. Such appreciation of context is sophisticated and as these 286 
infants were only six-months-old it seems that adapting model-based biases in different 287 
contexts is either automatic or learnt in the first few months of life and this flexibility may 288 
contribute to the biases adaptive value.  289 
Context also affects biases toward copying models belonging to a particular group, 290 
such as an age group. One- and two-year-olds generally imitate spontaneous behaviour 291 
exhibited by adults more than peers, but the context affects this replication, such that 292 
imitation of parents is more likely to consist of motor skills (e.g. tool use) whereas affective 293 
behaviours are imitated from siblings and peers (Kuczynski, Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, 294 
1987). These two types of behaviour (motor skills and affective behaviours) represent 295 
different functions, and therefore could elicit different model-based biases. This extends into 296 
early childhood; four- to five-year-old children imitate adults more than children and same 297 
age peers when an action is novel, but copy a peer over an older child and adult when the 298 
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action is not novel (Zmyj et al., 2011). In the first context, the function may be to learn a new 299 
skill and, therefore, children should be biased towards copying the model who belongs to the 300 
more proficient group whereas in the second context, the action is familiar and, therefore, the 301 
predominant motivation may be to copy behaviour appropriate for a child, and thus children 302 
copy another child. Indeed, when the context is play infants show higher fidelity copying of a 303 
three-year-old child versus an adult (Ryalls, Gul, & Ryalls, 2000) and peers over older 304 
children and adults (Zmyj, Aschersleben, Prinz, & Daum, 2012), and children also prefer 305 
clothes, toys, games and foods endorsed by children over those endorsed by adults (Shutts et 306 
al., 2010). Furthermore, in a diffusion chain paradigm, when an adult demonstrated 307 
functionally irrelevant actions, in a functionally oriented way, the first child copied these 308 
actions but subsequent children parsed out the action of the child model they had witnessed 309 
(Flynn, 2008). Conversely, when an adult model demonstrated irrelevant actions in a playful 310 
way the behaviour spread; the children copied the child models (Nielsen, Cucchiaro, & 311 
Mohomedally, 2012). This implies children assess the context and copy individuals 312 
belonging to groups who will be most proficient in that context, so will most aid their 313 
interaction with that environment. Alternatively, and as discussed in Section 3, copying may 314 
not always be driven by a desire to learn but instead a desire to share a social experience 315 
(Užgiris, 1981), or become more integrated with a social group (Over & Carpenter, 2012).  316 
Context also influences perceptions of the relative proficiency of one model (or 317 
group) over another model (or group). When three- to five-year-olds, presented with stick 318 
figure „adult‟ or „child‟ models, were asked who would provide more reliable answers to 319 
questions, children selected the adult when the questions were within the adult domain, such 320 
as the nutritional value of food, but when the subject area was toys children deferred to the 321 
child model (VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009). An ability to consider the domain of the 322 
behaviour alongside the model characteristics is adaptive as it allows for contextual flexibility 323 
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in behaviour. Moreover, children demonstrate flexibility in their choice, such that when 324 
children are informed that a toy is „the adult‟s favourite toy‟ they defer to the adult, rather 325 
than a child model, for subsequent information regarding that toy (VanderBorght & Jaswal, 326 
2009). The additional flexibility of understanding that there may be exceptions to a domain 327 
appropriate model-based bias is cognitively sophisticated and adaptively biases the child 328 
towards the most proficient model in each specific instance.  329 
Evaluating context is an important skill in ensuring that model-based biases towards 330 
certain models and categories (e.g. adult versus child) may be used flexibly. The flexibility of 331 
biases ensure that whilst children have biases towards copying individuals based on their 332 
group membership they understand that these groups have different skills involving varying 333 
degrees of functional and social relevance for the observing child. Therefore, this flexibility 334 
increases the adaptive value of model-based biases.  335 
 336 
From Early Childhood 337 
Evaluating a model’s testimony. Evaluating model testimony is important for 338 
proposition 2 (children are biased toward copying the most proficient models). Here we see 339 
an example of a cognitive skill that develops throughout early childhood, influencing the 340 
discrimination of particular models. Studies involving model testimony have shown that 341 
three-year-olds show mixed discrimination of proficient and less proficient models, with 342 
evidence of copying the behaviour of the reliable model (Birch et al., 2008; Corriveau & 343 
Harris, 2009a) but also a lack of discrimination of accurate over inaccurate informants 344 
(Koenig & Harris, 2005b). However, by four to six years, children consistently copy reliable 345 
models over unreliable labellers for copying labels for novel objects (Koenig et al., 2004; 346 
Koenig & Harris, 2005b; Vázquez et al., 2012) and artefact use (Birch et al., 2008). Six-year-347 
olds also copy reliable labellers over tangential labellers, who are not inaccurate but fail to 348 
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answer the question, although four-year-olds fail to make such a distinction (Vázquez et al., 349 
2012). Furthermore, three-year-olds have difficulty discriminating between models when the 350 
reliable informant is anything other than 100% accurate, whereas four-year-olds are able to 351 
make distinctions between a model who was right 75% of the time versus a model who was 352 
right 25% of the time (Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007). Recently, Lucas, Lewis, 353 
Pala, Wong & Berridge (2013) have shown an association between specific cognitive skills 354 
and evaluation of a model‟s testimony; children who demonstrated stronger false belief 355 
understanding were more likely to copy the model with the more accurate prior testimony, 356 
than children with poorer false belief understanding. Whether it is the development of false 357 
beliefs per se or the ability to hold in mind multiple constructs at the same time, irrespective 358 
of whether they refer to mental states or not, this study shows a clear developmental shift in 359 
the use of model based biases. Furthermore, this study highlights the importance of 360 
investigating which specific cognitive skills affect model-based biases.  361 
Understanding knowledge states. Another way in which models can be evaluated is 362 
through the use of the model‟s self-declared knowledge state. Models can express different 363 
levels of confidence in their knowledge state by using terms such as „know‟, „think‟, „guess‟ 364 
and „don‟t know‟ that present a scale of knowledge confidence. Here, we see increasingly 365 
sophisticated understanding of the subtle differences in model self-declared knowledge states, 366 
throughout early childhood. For example, children as young as three years are able to 367 
distinguish between a model verbally indicating uncertainty (“I think this is a spoon”) and 368 
one indicating certainty (“This is a spoon”) in a novel word copying paradigm (Jaswal & 369 
Malone, 2007), but struggle with subtleties of „know‟, „think‟ and „guess‟ (Moore, Bryant, & 370 
Furrow, 1989). By four years, children are able to distinguish between „know‟ versus „think‟ 371 
or „guess‟ and this improves with age, but until eight years children have difficulty 372 
distinguishing between „think‟ and „guess‟ (Moore et al., 1989). With increasing age comes 373 
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an expanding vocabulary reflected in an increasing ability to differentiate the subtle 374 
differences between model‟s self-declared knowledge state.  375 
Children also adapt to the context of the responses; if a model‟s hesitant response 376 
could be caused by indecision rather than uncertainty, four-year-olds are more likely to 377 
accept a model‟s artefact label (Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001) so as children develop they 378 
become more skilled at evaluating the subtle differences in a model‟s declared knowledge 379 
state. This understanding aids both children‟s assessment of the potential proficiency of the 380 
model. For example, self-declared knowledge can assist in ascertaining the proficiency of the 381 
model. Model-based biases involving a model‟s self-declared knowledge state occur from as 382 
young as three years of age, with increased word learning (Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001; 383 
Sabbagh, Wdowiak, & Ottaway, 2003) and irrelevant action reproduction (Wood et al., 2012) 384 
following demonstrations from models with declared knowledge versus declared ignorance.  385 
Assessing specialists and generalists. Evaluation of model testimony might depend 386 
upon the speciality of the model‟s knowledge and the speciality of the to-be-learnt behaviour. 387 
Humans have common shared knowledge; we all know the difference between cats and dogs. 388 
But we also have specialist knowledge; doctors have expertise in anatomy while farmers have 389 
expertise with crops. It follows that if a model fails to show proficiency in shared general 390 
knowledge the perception of his/her proficiency should be more negatively affected than if 391 
the same model fails to show proficiency in an area of specialist knowledge. Young children 392 
are able to make this important distinction, as three- and four-year-olds do not copy a model 393 
who specialised in labelling dog species over a neutral model for novel artefact labelling, but 394 
a model who wrongly labelled dogs as cats was not chosen over a neutral model (Koenig & 395 
Jaswal, 2011). This skill improves with development (Koenig & Jaswal, 2011); whilst four-396 
year-olds do not generalise beyond word knowledge having witnessed a reliable word 397 
labeller, five-year-old children generalise that the reliable word labeller will also excel in 398 
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broader facts (Brosseau-Liard & Birch, 2010). This assessment of specialists and generalists 399 
allows children to use more subtle group membership model-based biases rather than more 400 
salient distinctions (e.g. age) whilst ensuring that they realise the potential limitations of this 401 
group membership.  402 
Tracking prior personal experience and knowledge. A further evaluative tool 403 
available to children is to evaluate models in comparison with their own knowledge. When 404 
given no previous chance to interact with a task, five-year-olds will generally copy the 405 
irrelevant actions demonstrated, but when they have successful prior interaction with a task, 406 
children will copy a new solution demonstrated by a model but parse out the causally 407 
irrelevant actions demonstrated by the model (Wood, Kendal & Flynn, 2013). Likewise, 408 
three-year-old observers only copy a model until this modelled information results in failure, 409 
and four- and five-year-olds improve upon this by only copying models up to the point at 410 
which the social information provided by the model conflicts with their personal information, 411 
the latter they then favour (Clément, Koenig, & Harris, 2004; Ma & Ganea, 2010).  412 
A child‟s reliance on her personal information is affected by the interplay between the 413 
efficacy of her own behaviour and the efficacy of the model‟s actions, such that children with 414 
a difficult prior experience are more likely to imitate an adult‟s precise means of achieving 415 
something, compared to children with an easy prior experience (Williamson et al., 2008). 416 
When the model‟s tool choice conflicts with the child‟s knowledge of the optimum tool for 417 
task completion, children ignore a model‟s choice unless the model explicitly states that her 418 
method is functionally appropriate or when the model‟s choice is only slightly less efficient 419 
than the child‟s preference (DiYanni & Kelemen, 2008). A developing confidence in one‟s 420 
personal knowledge within a task thus ensures effective evaluation of a model‟s behaviour. 421 
However, over confidence in one‟s personal information causes the rejection of potentially 422 
useful social information (Jaswal, McKercher, & VanderBorght, 2008); here, children were 423 
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asked to pick which model gave the right plural or past tense of a novel word. A previously 424 
unreliable model‟s choice was endorsed over a previously reliable model because the 425 
unreliable model followed the general grammatical pattern known to the child (add an „s‟ for 426 
plurals and „ed‟ for past tense) rather than an irregular change in word. However, what is 427 
unclear is whether children accepted the less reliable model‟s information or whether they 428 
just used personal information. Whilst this may lead to a reluctance to accept potentially 429 
reliable social information, generally, evaluating the model, relative to ones personal 430 
information, generally ensures the critical use of model-based biases.  431 
Calibrating multiple pieces of information or cues. There are instances whereby 432 
children need to evaluate multiple pieces of information about a model and this information 433 
may pertain to different biases presented in Section 1. For example, a child may receive 434 
information from a proficient child or an incapable adult (Wood et al., 2012). When this 435 
occurs, children need to calibrate biases regarding age and proficiency. For example, children 436 
favour older, over younger, children when making food choices, only until older models are 437 
shown to be less competent than younger models in an unrelated domain (Brody & 438 
Stoneman, 1985), and three- and four-year-olds will choose to label a novel object in 439 
accordance with a child model, rejecting the adult‟s label, if the adult‟s previous behaviour 440 
was unreliable (Jaswal & Neely, 2006). Thus, children calibrate a group-based bias of model 441 
age against, the potentially more informative, proficiency bias and are more biased towards 442 
proficiency. Likewise, when the visual access of a model is more important than a reputation 443 
for proficiency five-year-old children will rely more heavily on a model‟s visual access than 444 
prior accuracy when locating a hidden object (Brosseau-Liard & Birch, 2011).  445 
Such calibration also occurs with regard to familiarity and proficiency model-based 446 
biases. When three- to five-year-old children were given conflicting artefact labels and 447 
functions from a known or unknown teacher they copied the known teacher when no further 448 
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information was provided (Corriveau & Harris, 2009b). However, when the unfamiliar 449 
teacher was more accurate than the familiar teacher at labelling familiar objects, four- and 450 
five-year-old children moderated their trust of the models, whilst three-year-olds showed 451 
little change in behaviour. Thus, calibration is another cognitive skill that shows changes with 452 
development. Perhaps three-year-old children have a bias towards familiar adults but have 453 
not developed a proficiency model-based bias. Such an explanation is unlikely as from 454 
infancy children seem able to judge proficiency (Zmyj et al., 2010; see proposition 2). 455 
Alternatively, three-year-old children may be more influenced by the familiarity bias than a 456 
proficiency bias, due to a lack of social interactions with unfamiliar individuals. Lastly, three-457 
year-old children may struggle with such calibration in comparison to older children, perhaps 458 
due to a poorer working memory. Such a proposal could be tested by assessing the calibration 459 
of older individuals when a cognitive load is put upon their working memory.  460 
There are other instances where children fail to calibrate; when two models grasp at 461 
opaque cups, three- to four-year-olds choose the cup grasped by the model who saw which 462 
cup held the reward (they choose the „seeing‟ model), but when both models point at the 463 
different locations children did not favour the „seeing‟ model, indicating that the pointing of 464 
the „unseeing‟ model was confusing (Palmquist, Burns, & Jaswal, 2012). For children of this 465 
age, the model-based biases towards pedagogical cues (pointing) may be stronger than biases 466 
towards models that are proficient due to their visual access, the latter of which is more 467 
cognitively complex for the child‟s understanding. Likewise, five-year-old children‟s 468 
imitation of a model is more influenced by the model‟s group membership (adult versus 469 
child) than the model‟s knowledge state (model stating knowledge or ignorance about task 470 
completion) even though children of this age are able to correctly identify knowledge state 471 
(Wood et al., 2012). This indicates that a failure to correctly calibrate biases is not due to a 472 
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lack of ability to implement one of the biases but due to the lack of experience a child has had 473 
with multiple biases or the cognitive load required within such calibration.  474 
Alternatively, young children may understand that a model‟s self-declared knowledge 475 
state is not always an accurate gauge of the reliability or utility of the behaviour they exhibit. 476 
A sophisticated assessment of a model‟s credibility must involve calibration of self-declared 477 
knowledge and behavioural accuracy of the model. Adults are able to make such calibrations 478 
(Tenney, MacCoun, Spellman, & Hastie, 2007; Tenney, Spellman, & MacCoun, 2008) but, 479 
whilst four- and five-year-olds are able to make accurate judgements regarding knowledge 480 
and accuracy independently, they are unable to discredit models that exhibit inconsistencies 481 
between knowledge and accuracy (Tenney, Small, Kondrad, Jaswal, & Spellman, 2011). 482 
This, again, supports the notion that children can process single model-based biases but find 483 
the calibration of multiple biases challenging. There is perhaps a cognitive cost associated 484 
with model-based biases; some model-based biases, such as a bias towards pedagogical cues, 485 
may be automatic and dominate in younger children even when more relevant model 486 
characteristics, such as proficiency, are available.  487 
 488 
Summary 489 
 We have highlighted some of the cognitive skills required for children to employ 490 
model-based biases. Many of these skills develop in the first five years of a child‟s life and 491 
are a vital part of a child‟s social cognition; for example, monitoring affect and perspective 492 
taking. Other cognitive skills enable children to move beyond employing model-based biases, 493 
to evaluating these biases. This leads to flexibility in their use by understanding context, 494 
assessing specialists and generalists, tracking prior personal experience and calibrating 495 
multiple biases. These abilities require other cognitive skills such as language and working 496 
memory. Additionally, many of these cognitive skills show a developmental shift and require 497 
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experience. Development increases flexibility in the use of model-based biases that allows 498 
children to move beyond simple biases to evaluating context as well as a model‟s behaviour.  499 
 500 
Section 3: Future directions 501 
  502 
Here, we suggest avenues of investigation of model-based biases beyond our 503 
argument of their adaptive value and exploration of their development. Specifically, we focus 504 
on the emerging argument that social learning and, potentially, model-based biases are not 505 
solely based on individuals acquiring the best environmental information and that model-506 
based biases may not always lead to the most adaptive behaviour. Following this, we 507 
highlight the usefulness of a comparative perspective, demonstrating that model-based biases 508 
in non-human animals show both convergences and divergences with that of children.  509 
 510 
Understanding the social side of model-based biases  511 
This review has deliberately focussed on the adaptive value of model-based biases, 512 
arguing that preferentially copying certain models will lead to learning the most adaptive 513 
behaviour for one‟s environment. However, we accept that we have assumed that the 514 
behaviours copied are primarily functional (e.g. tool use or culturally appropriate). However, 515 
to-be learnt behaviour may also be inherently social, and social interaction is an additional or 516 
alternative function of imitation (Grusec, & Abramovitch, 1982; Over & Carpenter, 2012; 517 
Užgiris, 1981). Therefore, an interesting future direction would be to focus on the interplay 518 
between social and functional motivations to copy within the context of model-based biases. 519 
For example, as seen in the previous section, children‟s model-based biases change if the to-520 
be-copied behaviour becomes more social (e.g. play) than functional (Zmyj et al., 2011). 521 
Investigating model-based biases in the context of how the content of the modelled behaviour 522 
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affects the use of model-based biases would shed more light on whether the same biases are 523 
employed differently when the domain of the to-be-copied behaviour varies.  524 
Additionally, it would be interesting to explore model-based biases which focus on 525 
the social behaviour of models, building upon work showing that how socially engaging a 526 
model is can affect whether children copy her or him (Elekes & Kiraly, 2012; Nielsen, 2006; 527 
Nielsen, Simcock, & Jenkins, 2008). Nielsen (2006) and Nielsen & Blank (2011) argue that 528 
this is due to a social motivation to share an experience or create an affiliation and that 529 
certain social, or indeed anti-social behaviours, influence the copying of functional 530 
behaviours. Furthermore, witnessing scenarios involving third-person ostracism can increase 531 
imitation in children (Over & Carpenter, 2009). This last example, whilst not demonstrating a 532 
model-based bias, does suggest that the model-based biases in the previous examples may be 533 
a by-product of an emotional reaction to a social situation rather than an evolutionary 534 
adaption. Of course, such behaviour might be both an emotional reaction and adaptive, in that 535 
pro-social behaviour is thought to be an evolutionary adaption (Dawkins, 1989). Thus 536 
children may be biased towards copying models that are pro-social both in order to obtain 537 
pro-social traits and because pro-social behaviour offers a degree of prestige.  538 
 539 
Understanding when model-based biases may not be adaptive 540 
As mentioned in the introduction, social learning is not seen as universally adaptive 541 
and there may also be instances whereby a model-based social learning strategy is not 542 
inherently adaptive. For example, a bias towards copying a model that is successful in one 543 
domain might lead to other, non-adaptive behaviours, also being copied from this model, a 544 
phenomenon that is often used in advertising through celebrity endorsements. This 545 
"piggybacking" (Mesoudi & O‟Brien, 2008, p 23) of non-adaptive behaviour from a 546 
particular model could lead to maladaptive behaviour. An example of this is the copying of 547 
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causally irrelevant actions demonstrated by an adult, but not a child, model (Wood, et al., 548 
2012). The potential side effects of model-based biases need to be better understood in order 549 
to understand their pervasiveness and development.  550 
  551 
Comparative research 552 
It is interesting to see whether model-based biases are unique to humans. A 553 
comparative perspective is also useful to developmental research as the presence or absence 554 
of particular biases may shed light on what cognitive skills (present or absent in other 555 
species) are necessary and/or sufficient for model-based biases to be used. The adaptive 556 
nature of model-based biases has been discussed in relation to non-human animals‟ 557 
(henceforth animals) social learning (Laland, 2004) and there has been a surge of activity 558 
directed at identifying and understanding the variety of biases that might influence social 559 
learning in animals (Kendal, Coolen, van Bergen, & Laland, 2005; Rendell et al., 2011). 560 
Work with animals demonstrates some interesting convergences with children. For example, 561 
in line with proposition 1, both dogs (Range, Viranyi, & Huber, 2007) and chimpanzees 562 
(Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2007) seem able to assess a model‟s intentions, 563 
and are more likely to copy unusual behaviour when it seems intentional. Both these species 564 
are social animals perhaps suggesting a link between social cognition and this bias.  565 
In line with proposition 2, that children are biased towards copying the most 566 
proficient models, capuchin monkeys prefer to observe more successful models although 567 
there was no evidence that this increased their copying of one model over another (Ottoni, de 568 
Resende, & Izar, 2005). Kendal et al (submitted) fitted statistical models to chimpanzees‟ 569 
interactions with an extractive foraging advice and found some evidence that chimpanzees 570 
copy expert individuals. Investigating this proposition in animals seems like a fruitful avenue. 571 
More research has been conducted with animals regarding proposition 3, that children are 572 
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biased towards models belonging to a group that may have a reputation for being more 573 
proficient; stickleback fish copy the feeding location of older, larger fish as opposed to 574 
smaller, younger fish (Duffy et al., 2009). Mice are more influenced by the food choices of 575 
adult mice over younger mice (Choleris, Guo, Liu, Mainardi, & Valsecchi, 1997) and young 576 
female guppies copy the mate choice of older versus younger female guppies (Amlacher & 577 
Dugatkin, 2005). Wild chimpanzees show selective attention towards observing models of 578 
the same age or older, but not younger, than themselves (Biro et al., 2003), and captive 579 
chimpanzees‟ copying of food retreival methods is influenced more by older versus younger 580 
individuals (Horner, Proctor, Bonnie, Whiten, & de Waal, 2010). The bredth of species that 581 
show this bias indicates that it is a relatively cognitively simple model-based bias to process.  582 
In line with proposition 4, some animals are biased towards models who are more 583 
gentically similar to themselves (rats; Saggerson & Honey, 2006) and more familiar (fish; 584 
Swaney, Kendal, Capon, Brown, & Laland, 2001), again suggesting that this may be a salient 585 
model-based bias. Finally, with regard to proposition 5, some animals are biased towards 586 
individuals with high status; dominant individuals appear to elicit social learning more than 587 
subordinates in a wide variety of species (e.g. chimpanzees, Bonnie, Horner, Whiten, & de 588 
Waal, 2007, Horner et al., 2010; capuchins, Dindo, Thierry, & Whiten, 2008; hens, Nicol & 589 
Pope, 1994, 1999; and seals, Sanvito, Galimberti, & Miller, 2007). However, the degree to 590 
which this is analogous to a copying high-status individuals bias in children depends upon the 591 
degree to which high-status represents aggressive force (power) or deference (prestige) in 592 
human and non-human species. Work with animals also offers some interesting 593 
interpretations for these biases. For example in lemurs, dominant individuals were more 594 
likely to be copied, as they monopolised resources (Kendal et al., 2010) and thus provided the 595 
most demonstrations. In children non-monopolization of resources has been seen (Flynn & 596 
Whiten, 2012) yet the bias remained; the dominant children were watched out of choice.  597 
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Another interesting interpretation from animal research is that increased social 598 
learning from a particular model may not always be due to model-based biases, but instead be 599 
due to an attentional by-product. Benskin, Mann and Lachlan (2002) and Katz and Lachlan 600 
(2003) suggest that female finches copy the feeding location of male rather than female 601 
conspecifics because females pay attention to males as potential mates, while females do not 602 
need to attend to one another. Conversely, male finches show no feeder preference because 603 
male finches pay equal attention to males (as potential rivals) and females (as potential 604 
mates). Likewise, male canaries are more innovative and better at personally learning a new 605 
feeding behaviour, but behaviours demonstrated by the females are more likely to be copied 606 
as the males are aggressive towards male observers (Cadieu, Fruchard, & Cadieu, 2010). 607 
Lastly, wild vervet monkeys learn to retreive more food from an artificial fruit task when the 608 
task is modelled successfully by a female rather than a male, possibly because of females‟ 609 
tolerance of observer presence (van de Waal, Renevey, Favre, & Bshary, 2010) or their 610 
likelihood, as the philopatric sex, of possessing relevant knowledge.  611 
This body of work on animals suggests that model-based biases are not unique to 612 
humans. However, what may be unique to humans is the flexibilty with which biases are used 613 
through children‟s developing ability to be receptive to pedagogical cues (Call & Tomasello, 614 
1999), perspective take (Brosseau-Liard & Birch, 2011), categorise and generalise 615 
proficiency (Koenig & Jaswal, 2011), assess context (Zmyj et al., 2011) and calibrate 616 
multiple model-based biased (Jaswal & Neely, 2006), not to mention our species‟ 617 
understanding of complex language and higher-order mental state understanding (Jaswal & 618 
Malone, 2007). Alternatively, what could be unique to humans is that copying serves a social 619 
as well as a functional motivation, as outlined above (Nielsen, 2009). Animals may have the 620 
ability to categorise and generalise proficiency, or callibrate multiple model-based biases, and 621 
these are avenues that need further investigation.  622 
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 623 
Conclusions 624 
Children are prolific social learners, adopting the language, tool-use, knowledge and 625 
beliefs of those around them. We have highlighted that children do not source information 626 
indiscriminately, but rather use biases to guide their copying of others‟ behaviour. What 627 
makes children‟s social learning truly impressive is their ability to implement strategies of 628 
model-based biases. These biases are adaptive in that they enable children to source the „best‟ 629 
trait variant without the cost of assessing every trait variant displayed within the environment. 630 
Whilst some biases seem automatic, children need a suite of cognitive skills to use other 631 
model-based biases. These cognitive abilities are not all necessary for the occurrence of 632 
model-based biases, but they all assist in ensuring model-based biases are effective, because 633 
they enhance children‟s appraisals of models and allow children to flexibly evaluate the 634 
context. Model-based biases and some of the accompanying cognitive skills required to learn 635 
and maintain these biases are not unique to humans. However, the combination of model-636 
based biases and children‟s development of species-unique socio-cognitive skills (Dean, 637 
Kendal, Schapiro, Thierry, & Laland, 2012; Whiten & Erdal, 2012), such as language and 638 
understanding another‟s mental states, means that children stand alone in their ability to 639 
source the right model for them, in the right context, and use this model‟s behaviour to guide 640 
their own behaviour; resulting in a uniquely adaptive form of social learning. Research into 641 
model-based biases now needs to go beyond identifying the presence and direction of model-642 
based biases and move towards an understanding of the relationship between specific 643 
cognitive skills and the emergence and development of individual biases and the interaction 644 
(and potential changeable hierarchies) of different model-based biases.  645 
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